Competitive strategy & JBU?

In preparation for my “Strategic Theory” class, I’m reading Michael Porter’s HBR article on competitive strategy. Here are some of my reflections, particularly about how these theories might apply to an institution like JBU.

1) I’ve probably spent most of my time, perhaps because I’m a “middle manager” on “operational efficiency” instead of “strategy.” I think some of that’s because our strategy is fairly well defined as an institution already (interdenominational, comprehensive, regional, high quality, small, head-heart-hand, etc.). Some of that’s because we don’t really don’t have a strategic planning process at JBU. And some of that’s probably just a personal predilection (because, despite studying some forms of strategy most of my life, I think the quest for a “strategic” holy grail big decision is overrated, and the slow accumulation of lots of good little decisions is typically underrated).

2) Using Porter’s categories, we appear primarily to be a “differentiation” organization (the big area competitors for higher education being NWACC, UofA, and Phoenix, so we’re the differentiated “Christian” alternative to all three and neither the “low-cost” nor “highly focused” alternative). We also appear to be following a “needs-based” positioning strategy in which we appeal to a specific segment of customers (Christians interested in higher education) vs. “variety-based” (a trade school, for example) or “access-based” (primarily on-line, as an example).

3) The main trade-off that we appear to be making is by focusing on “Christ over All” and “Head-Heart-Hand” in terms of the faculty, courses, and content we teach. Those will be impossible for a UofA, Phoenix, or NWACC to match, at least in our traditional programs. For KLRC and the Centers, that also appears true, though I wonder whether the same is true in terms of our G&PS programs. It doesn’t appear to be that way from the students’ perspective (we’re more the “convenience” option than the “Christian” option in these areas according to their feedback).

4) Given that we’re also emphasize convenience and quality, is our strategy more to “straddle” at least these two trade-off areas (convenience and quality), and does that make us vulnerable to competition on these grounds (a point Pat has been making for a long time that if the UofA ever really started competing with us in G&PS, we’d be in trouble)?

5) I appreciate the idea that “the essence of strategy is choosing what NOT to do,” but not doing anything is a bad strategy as well, so this could just as easily be said that the essence of strategy is choosing what TO do, which seems so much more elementary when phrased this way. But hey, that’s what academics do, right? We say extremely simple things in novel ways.

6) I also like Porter’s idea that all activities need to “fit” together as part of an overall package of linked activities if it is going be a sustainable (10 years or more) strategy, but that again sometimes begs the question of what to do and what not to do. Does “nursing” fit into the JBU system of linked activities? Yes, maybe, no? I could pick any of these and make a good case that our “strategy” calls for or excludes this choice. I guess what I’m struggling with is that the dividing line between terms is often fuzzier than an article like this might imply. Strategy and operational effectiveness can look a lot alike. Ditto for “management” and “leadership.” I hear people trying to make distinctions between these categories that in my practical experience are pretty much meaningless.

7) Porter’s concern that the “growth imperative is hazardous to strategy” hits close to home. Does this mean that we shouldn’t have added G&PS (because they blur our Christian and quality distinctives and are more replicable by our competitors) or that we shouldn’t be headed toward on-line education (for similar reasons)? Does this mean that my “innovation fund” idea is misguided in that it assumes growth, both in terms of quality and quantity? Does this argue that we should stick closer to our somewhat fundamentalist roots in terms of our conversations about various hot-button topics? Or should I be thinking more in terms of “no more centers and no more radio stations” instead of “no more growth in academic programs”? In some ways, Porter’s point about “deepening distinctives” is what I’ve seen us doing with our integration of faith & learning efforts, our formal evaluation emphasis on quality teaching, our all-campus recruiting campaigns, etc. In all of those cases, we’re emphasizing that we’re different from the UofA, NWACC, and Phoenix, so these actions reinforce our strategic choice instead of moving us away from it. And Porter’s point about growing by adding “stand-alone” units could in theory include the Centers and KLRC, all of whom have their clear, separate, and self-funded identities.